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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Case No. 900022-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
JOHNNY MEDINA DURAN, t 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's 
motion to dismiss count 3 of the information charging defendant 
as a habitual criminal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(1990) in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, presiding. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). However, this Court may reasonably 
dismiss this appeal because it does not fall within the 
provisions for appeal set forth in Utah Code Ann § 77-18a-l 
(Supp. 1990).-1 
Utah Code Ann § 77-18a-l (Supp. 1990) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant 
from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, 
whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that 
affects the substantial rights of the 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The two issues on appeal, both closely related, are (1) 
whether this court should review a ruling denying relief later 
obtained by defendant by dismissal of the charge of habitual 
criminal and (2) whether defendant waived his right to appeal a 
pre-plea issue by entering a voluntary unconditional plea. 
Appealability in this case is within the discretion of this 
Court. Utah R. App. P. 5(e). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in the Appendix where not set forth in the 
body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Johnny Medina Duran, was charged by 
information with 2 counts of unlawful distribution of cocaine, a 
Schedule II controlled substance, a second degree felony, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1990), and with 
being a habitual criminal, a first degree felony, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-8-1001 (1990) (R. 5-7). Defendant moved to 
dismiss the habitual criminal charge (R. 22-37). The trial 
Cont. defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon 
petition for review the appellate court 
decides the appeal would be in the interest 
of justice; or 
To the extent that defendant has characterized his 
appeal as interlocutory, he has waived his right to appeal 
through his voluntary, unconditional guilty plea. There are no 
other possible grounds for appeal under section 77-18a-l. 
_o_ 
court, following a second hearing on the matter at which 
evidence in support of the charge was introduced, denied the 
motion (Transcript of July 28, 1989, hereinafter "T." 1-15; 
transcript of October 17, 1989, hereinafter "TA." 1-12 and 58-66; 
and R. 87). Defendant moved for a continuance, in order to 
petition for interlocutory appeal, which was denied (TA. 11-14). 
Thereafter, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to 
the 2 counts of unlawful distribution of cocaine, and the trial 
court dismissed the charge of habitual criminal (TA. 58-64). 
Defendant now appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss that 
latter charge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with 2 counts of cocaine 
distribution and a violation of the habitual criminal statute (R. 
5-7). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge of his 
being a habitual criminal (R. 22-37, T. 1-15). At the first 
hearing on his motion, defendant argued that the State could not 
charge him with a violation of the habitual criminal statute 
because it could not then demonstrate that any facts it then had 
about defendant's guilty plea to manslaughter in New Mexico, 
there a third degree felony, would result in a conviction of 
manslaughter in Utah, here a second degree felony (T. 1-4, 8-9). 
In response the State argued that the habitual criminal statute 
should be applied literally, so that the New Mexico voluntary 
manslaughter conviction should simply be assessed as a second 
degree felony under the Utah statute (T. 4-5). Additionally, the 
State suggested that the court might first compare the elements 
of both the New Mexico and Utah voluntary manslaughter statutes, 
and second, apply the facts surrounding the New Mexico conviction 
to the Utah law, all as an aid in determining the application of 
the habitual criminal statute (T. 5-7). 
Unwilling to retry defendant's New Mexico conviction, 
the trial court continued defendant's motion and requested the 
State obtain a transcript of defendant's New Mexico plea and any 
2 
existing plea statement (T. 9-11). 
On October 17, 1989, the trial court again heard 
defendant's continued motion to dismiss (R. 87 and TA. 1-11). 
Defendant acknowledged that he had received documentation from 
the State regarding his previous conviction in New Mexico (TA. 
3 
3). Defendant then proceeded with his argument on a new theory, 
to wit: the purpose of section 76-8-1001 was rehabilitative and 
so required a defendant serve 2 separate jail terms before it 
could be applied to enhance his sentence. Defendant thus argued 
that since he had served his New Mexico voluntary manslaughter 
sentence concurrently with his sentence for a Utah conviction of 
On the record the court "denied" defendant's motion, but the 
court's request for additional evidence makes clear that a 
continuance was intended (T. 10-11). In fact, the matter was 
continued to September 12, 1989, in order to allow time for the 
State to obtain documents from defendant's New Mexico plea 
hearing (T. 10-15). 
3 
The State later made part of the record this documentation, 
consisting of a partial transcript of the New Mexico plea 
proceedings, a certificate of Guilty Plea Proceedings, Plea and 
Disposition Agreement, Guilty Plea and Judgment, Judgment and 
Sentence, and Commitment to Penitentiary (R. 72-79 and 82). 
Also, evidence of defendant's conviction of theft by receiving 
was included (R. 80-81; TA. 6-7). After acknowledging receipt of 
the documentation defendant did not further argue the question of 
whether his acts in New Mexico would have constituted a second 
degree felony conviction in Utah for manslaughter (TA. 3). 
theft by receiving, the statute did not apply to him (TA. 3-5, 7-
9). The State argued that defendant's interpretation of the 
statute was mistaken (T. 5-7, 9). The trial court denied the 
motion finding that in this case defendant had twice been 
convicted, sentenced and committed. The court also stated that 
it believed the statute was intended to apply to different 
crimes, different sentences and different commitments, and that 
defendant's concurrent service of prison terms did not preclude 
the statute's operation in this case (TA. 9-11). 
Late in the proceeding, defendant pled guilty to counts 
1 and 2 of the information in exchange for the State's agreeing 
to dismiss the habitual criminal charge. The court then took 
defendant's guilty plea on the charges of cocaine distribution, 
granted the State's motion to dismiss the charge of habitual 
criminal and thereafter dismissed count 3 of the information (TA. 
58-64). At the very end of the hearing defendant indicated that 
he intended to reserve the denial of his motion to dismiss count 
3 as an issue for appeal. The trial court expressed doubt that 
an appellate court would review the matter, but permitted 
defendant to make a record (TA. 65-66). 
Defendant was sentenced on December 11, 1989, to serve 
concurrent terms of 1 to 15 years on each of the two counts of 
cocaine distribution (R. 97-98). Defendant filed his notice of 
appeal on January 10, 1990 (R. 101-102). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant appeals from a ruling denying his motion to 
dismiss the charge of his being a habitual criminal. However, 
that charge was dismissed by the trial court pursuant to a 
voluntary, unconditional plea agreement. Therefore, the denial 
of defendant's motion is moot and defendant has waived his right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Defendant's 
suggestion that his plea was conditional upon the preservation of 
his right to interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion to 
dismiss is factually and legally insupportable. The remarks of 
the trial court and counsel in connection with the plea bargain 
clearly show that the State, and more especially the trial court, 
neither agreed nor accepted a conditional plea, if, in fact, the 
State actually offered such. Further, the plea agreement does 
not preserve an issue the resolution of which will dispose of the 
case because the habitual criminal charge has already been 
dismissed. Therefore, the issue on appeal is an inappropriate 
basis for a conditional appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS MOOT AND DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO APPEAL HAS BEEN WAIVED BY 
DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY, UNCONDITIONAL 
AGREEMENT BY WHICH THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
CHARGE WAS DISMISSED. 
A. TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL CHARGE RENDERS THIS APPEAL MOOT. 
MA case is deemed moot when the requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." Burkett v. 
Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). 
In thi s case defendant filed a motion to dismiss count 
* *"- information cnary. • nim with being a habitual criminal 
(. . . 'Pol Towing two Hearings the trial court denied his 
motion : £~; •, and TA, 1 - 11) Thereafter, 
• i ' defendai it p] eci quilty to t wn rnuntf 
1 cocaine distribution, and trie State moved to dismiss the 
habitual criminal charge. Upon representation of the parties i n 
open court cnnce'ini i. ng 1: he pan: 111 u 1,ai*s ot the rjgreement, the tria J 
court dismissed the habitual criminal charge (TA. 57-64), 
In Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956), where 
the defender -^- -v.- n \*-vf-.i
 A . " • ••.-.: 
dismissal c ; the prosecution r : e ourpose *-f obtaining a more 
favorable place of tria3 *; United States Supreme Court stated, 
"On 1 y o n e i . • , . '.-.j.i.r.^  =•-..•.,.. •. 
a p p e a l . .- \ L- j 6 
The dismissal of the habitual criminal charge following 
t h e p 1 e a a g r e e m e i I t g a v e d e f e i I d a i I t p i: e c I s e 1 y 11 I e i: e 1 1 e f 11 i a t 
defendant sought when he first moved to have that charge 
dismissed Therefore, the issue of the trial court's having 
iiti t i.a I Jy d e n i e d - • •. m o t i o n i s m o o t . 
"[An appellate court] refrainfs] from adjudicating 
4 issues when the underlying case is moot. Burkett, 773 P.2d at 
4 
In Burkett, the Utah Supreme Court, citing prior opinion, 
indicated that it occasionally invoked an exception to the 
mootness doctrine, "as when the case presents an issue that 
affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and because of 
the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of 
evading review." Ld. at 44. 
The exception to the mootness doctrine should not be 
j invi,ik eci i n this c a s e . F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a l w a s r e n d e r e d 
44; see also State v. Davis, 721 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1986) 
(claimed error in trial court's sentencing orders rendered moot 
by defendant's having served sentence); Wickham v. Fisher, 629 
P. 2d 896, 900 (Utah 1981) (actual controversy must exist at stage 
of appellate review)• 
Here, defendant has challenged not the plea agreement 
and the resulting conviction, but only the court's pre-trial 
ruling denying his motion to dismiss. That ruling is clearly 
mooted by the dismissal of the charge and, consequently, this 
appeal should be dismissed. 
B. DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY, UNCONDITIONAL. 
GUILTY PLEA IS A WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS. 
A voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of the right to 
appeal all non-jurisdictional issues. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935, 937-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 
(Utah 1977) (knowing and voluntary entry of plea precludes 
reservation of issues for appeal). 
Cont. moot the instant the trial court dismissed the habitual 
criminal charge, rather than by the unanticipated development of 
events following the ruling appealed from, as in the usual case 
of mootness. Second, and more importantly, the application of 
the habitual criminal statute to foreign criminal judgments has 
appeared only once in the appellate decisions of this state since 
that section was first enacted more than 15 years ago and is, 
therefore, not of wide public concern. See State v. Johnson, 784 
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989) (section 76-8-1001 properly applied where 
defendant's plea to Idaho offense, admitted to be second degree 
felony in Utah, was voluntary). Further, the Utah Supreme Court 
has already disposed of defendant's other claim of error 
concerning the application of section 76-8-1001 to multiple terms 
of imprisonment. In State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1989), 
the court held that section 76-8-1001 was properly applied where 
the defendant was serving concurrent terms on convictions relied 
on to invoke the habitual criminal offense. Jd. at 207; State v. 
Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983) (section 76-8-1001 properly 
applied where defendant served partially overlapping terms). 
Defendant has no t challenged ': •:' validity of his plea; 
he has not moved to withdraw Iiiiss plea irig in the 
record or defendant's brief to suggest that defendant's plea was 
not entirely voluntary• 
Defendant suggests WJthout arquiny thai hit;- plea was 
conditional upon the preservation of the right to interlocutory 
appeal f tr, •-> court's denial i h. motion to dismiss the 
h a t . • - • > . : ' ^ i d 1 I»,»- 7 JI T h i s 
"claim" is without merit. 
A defendant, through his unconditional plea, waives the 
right to a p p ^ I » pt '-j- p 1 ^a mot i<jn » «> «1 \ sniiss , State v. Geer, 76b 
P. 2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, a defendant may retain 
his right to appeal a pre-plea ruling, and thereafter withdraw1' 
his plea if" M J C L P S S I u 1 on appeal , i f the plea is explicitly 
conditioned \ the parties and agreed to by the trial court. 
Sery, 758 - au ^38-40. I t is obvious that a coi id iti ona ] p] ea 
must bo >>.; -t among the parties and agreed to by the court if 
a defendant'- i; ht.s on appeal and effective judicial 
administration : limiting i ieed] ess 1 1 tigati oi i a re to be 
preserved _; hurt's discussioi i I n Sery makes clear that a 
definite statement of the terms of the plea agreement and a clear 
acceptance by the trial court of a conditional pled aro ^ essary 
preregui sites of a conditional plea reserving appellate review. 
The record is at best ambiguous on whether there was a 
conditional j: ;iea agi e«nipni hot W<M~?TI t ho State and defendant . 
Defendant claimed that the State "understood" that he would be 
reserving the issue of his motion to dismiss the habitual 
criminal charge as part of their agreement (TA. 65-66). The 
State was silent. This Court should not assume such silence to 
be assent, especially in light of the standards of explicitness 
referenced in Sery. 
More importantly, there is no suggestion in the record 
that the plea agreement was conditional on defendant's right to 
withdraw his plea if he were successful on appeal. Without the 
express reservation of the right to withdraw the plea, the 
essence of a conditional agreement simply doesn't exist. The 
implication of such an omission, in this case, is that defendant 
and the State did not truly condition their agreement on any 
outcome that might have resulted from defendant's appeal. This 
implication is strengthened by the fact that the State did not 
require defendant also plead guilty to the habitual criminal 
charge as it would reasonably have done if the issue of 
defendant's culpability on the habitual criminal charge was to be 
conditioned on the disposition of defendant's appeal. 
However, even if this Court should find that the State 
and defendant contemplated the reservation of defendant's right 
to appeal in conjunction with his guilty plea, the record clearly 
reveals that the trial court did not accept their arrangements. 
At the very end of the hearing the following exchange took place: 
MS. CORPORON [defense counsel]: Your Honor, 
I also wanted to indicate for the record, one 
final aspect of the agreement I had with 
counsel, and I believe she understood I would 
be specifically reserving on the record the 
issue of our Motion to Dismiss Count 3 of the 
Information and the legal issues raised 
regarding the habitual criminal statute, and 
it will be my intention to reserve those for 
appellate review. 
THE COURT: They have been dismissed. 
MS. CORPORON: That Is true, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: They will never hear it. The 
State has dismissed it, but you can make a 
record on that, if you want. 
MS. CORPORON: I would like to make the 
record, Your Honor, and discuss that with my 
client. 
THE COURT: You have a right to do what you 
want, but if it is dismissed there is nothing 
to appeal there is no issue. 
MS. CORPORON: I suspect that there is a 
great deal of validity in what the Court 
says, but 1 wou] c:i still like to reserve. 
THE COURT: If there is anything to appeal, 
and I don't know if Mr. Duran would want you 
to appeal it. What if you 1ost? 
MS. CORPORON: Well, I prefer not to say 
what --
THE COURT: You don't need to say anything, 
Mr. Duran. That is on the record. Whatever 
you do, you do. Since it is dismissed, there 
is not that issue facing Mr. Duran or the 
issue before the Court. 
(TA. 65-66). 
The court' s remarks merely i nd i cate a wi ] ] :i ngness to 
a] low defendant to pursue what it conceived to be a futile 
effort. There is nothing in the court's remarks 1 -uggest that 
it believed that defendant' ] t .y j >J ea was a ::t .i condi t i oned 
on his right to appea] an issue that had been rendered moot by 
dismissal of the charge. Indeed, defendant admits that the trial 
court did not UTOIIIPIK" * ll
 lCpj)t of H rond i t loud I plcvi 
(Appellant's Brief at 
Lastly, defendant's own acknowledgment that an 
appellate court might not review his appeal, recognizing the 
validity of the trial court's opinion on this point, clearly 
indicates that the alleged " conditional" plea agreement was less 
than firm (TA. 66). On such facts defendant cannot argue that 
the trial court accepted a plea conditioned on his right to 
appeal his motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge. 
C. RESOLUTION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT 
DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE BECAUSE THE 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE HAS BEEN DISMISSED. 
A conditional plea necessarily relates the appellate 
court's disposition of issue to be resolved on appeal (and the 
contingent right to withdraw the plea) to the disposition of the 
case. In Seryf the defendant's motion to suppress was denied. 
Thereafter, the defendant entered a plea of no contest, 
explicitly conditioned on the preservation of his ability to 
appeal the court's suppression ruling and to withdraw the plea if 
it was determined on appeal that the motion to suppress should 
have been granted. 
In finding the type of conditional plea therein at 
issue permissible in Utah, the court in Sery relied on authority 
explicitly approving of conditional pleas if resolution of the 
reserved issue on appeal was dispositive of the case. Sery, 758 
P.2d at 938, citing Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 
801, 803 n.4 (Alaska 1978) and People v. Reid, 420 Mich. 326, 362 
N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1984). 
In Oveson the defendant was charged with operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
He moved to suppress the breathalyzer results, and his motion was-
denied He then entered a pi ea of nolo contendere pursuant to an 
agi: eement presei i: i gl it to appea ,1 I he denla 1 "Of the 
suppression motion. In evaluating the propriety of the 
defendant *• appeal and establishing a policy for the review of 
i u t u 1.1; I t M ) K , l,he Alaska Supreme (Jour t. st.a teo, i 
5 
The second Cooksey criterion does not 
apply in this case. Even if we were to 
reverse the trial court's denial of Oveson's 
suppression motion# it would not definitively 
determine the outcome of the case. Oveson 
could still be tried and convicted of this 
offense on evidence other than the results of 
his breathalyzer examination. The procedure 
followed in this appeal in effect 
accomplishes an appeal of an interlocutory 
order, thus circumventing the requirements of 
Appellate Rules 23 and 24 for petitions for 
review. 
Henceforth, appeals under the Cooksey 
doctrine will not be approved unless it is 
clearly shown, and the parties have 
stipulated with trial court approval/ that 
our resolution of the issue reserved for 
appeal will be dispositive of the entire 
case. 
Id. at 803 n•4 (emphasis added). 
I n t l u i iijsi t hi I i nil I  M U M I i i l e n i i ' i l i d d e l ' t ' l i d . n i l s 
motion t o d i s m i s s t h e h a b i t u a l c r i m i n a l charge I s c o m p l e t e l y un-
r e l a t e d t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t y p l e a s on t h e 
coc a J n i-'1 rh ai 2 f endai i I: f i a s ne v e i" s ug g e s 1:ed t" h a t s 11 c i i 
r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s In f a c t , the only i ssue defendant presents 
on appeal concerns the trial court's denial of * motion to 
ciIsiiii.ss t h e habl I ua 1 I T n i i i n a i! r l i a r q e , and th» en d i sposed 
5 
Cooksey v. state, 524 p.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974)(appeal permitted 
from nolo contendere plea conditioned on defendant's right to 
appeal speedy trial issue). 
-13-
of by the trial court's dismissal of that charge. Thus, this 
appeal is not rationally related to any claim of error suggested 
by defendant. 
Here, as in Oveson, defendant did not petition this 
Court for permission to appeal from the trial court's denial of 
his motion when he had the opportunity and in the manner 
prescribed under rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Instead, defendant voluntarily entered his guilty plea to the two 
counts of cocaine distribution, thereby avoiding any further 
culpability on the habitual criminal charge. 
Defendant, having already achieved through the 
dismissal of the habitual criminal charge the benefit of a 
successful interlocutory appeal he never undertook, now seeks 
further gain by winning this court's leave to withdraw his guilty 
plea without having put at risk his possible guilt on the 
habitual criminal charge. Defendant's tactic is a transparent 
attempt to gain further bargaining leverage with respect to the 
cocaine charges. This Court should summarily frustrate 
defendant's efforts to now create a new plea agreement never 
agreed to by either the State or the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's appeal be dismissed. 
DATED this ^ day of January, 1991. 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 7^> day of 
January, 1991. 
_i £ _ 
APPENDIX 
PART 10 
HABITUAL CRIMINALS 
76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination. 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of 
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1001, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 46, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Attempted first degree murder. 
Interpretation of statute. 
No separate sentence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Presumption of regularity. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Fact that habitual criminal statute allows 
prosecutor discretion whether or not to charge 
defendant under its provisions does not make it 
unconstitutional. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 
1275 (Utah 1978). 
This section and § 76-8-1002 do not violate 
federal constitutional provisions against dou-
ble jeopardy. The statutes do not create a new 
crime; they merely enhance punishment for 
the latest crime in cases where the defendant 
has been previously convicted of and sent to 
prison for two other felony offenses. State v. 
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985). 
Separate and consecutive sentence for being 
a habitual criminal subjected defendant to dou-
ble jeopardy; his habitual criminal sentences 
should have been merged with his sentences 
for the underlying offenses. State v. Williams, 
773 P.2d 1368 (1989). 
Attempted first degree murder. 
Since attempted first degree murder is not 
excepted in the habitual criminal statute, trial 
court did not err in using defendant's convic-
tion for that crime as the underlying substan-
tive offense to trigger the habitual criminal 
statute. State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6 (1989). 
Interpretation of statute. 
Intent of this statute is to make persistent 
offenders subject to greater sanctions, and not 
to reform. Therefore, the particular sequence of 
prior crimes is immaterial, and defendant was 
treated properly where he had served only two 
weeks of the first prior commitment when the 
second prior commitment began to run. State 
v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983). 
Trial court properly instructed the jury that 
the word "committed" means the order by 
which a person is sent to prison, that each time 
a person is ordered sent to prison in carrying 
out a sentence, that person is being committed, 
and that it is irrelevant whether multiple com-
mitments are to be served concurrently or con-
secutively. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 
(Utah 1987). 
No separate sentence. 
This section does not create a new crime; it 
merely enhances punishment for the latest 
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Rule 5 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of ap-
peal be retroactively validated in federal civil 
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199. 
Rule 5, Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the 
fee for filing a notice of appeal in the trial court and the docketing fee in the 
appellate court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together 
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition 
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied, 
the filing fee shall be refunded. 
(c) Content of petition. The petition shall contain: 
(1) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the con-
trolling question of law determined by the order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) A statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the 
question was properly raised before the trial court and ruled upon; 
(3) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal 
should be permitted; and 
(4) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation. 
(5) The petition shall include a copy of the order of the trial court from 
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and opinion. 
(d) Answer. Within 10 days after service of the petition, any other party 
may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies 
of the answer shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original and four copies 
shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. The petition and any answer shall be 
submitted without oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
(e) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision or that a determination of the correctness 
of the order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
lar issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the appellate court 
may determine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have 
been docketed by the granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent 
to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the time required, for 
appeals from final judgments. 
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